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Since 1963, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a 
constitutional right for American groups, organizations, and persons to 
pursue civil litigation under the First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.1 However, in three cases involving 
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 1. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 557, 576–89 (1999) (surveying the development 
of the constitutional right to access the courts under the First Amendment and proposing standards for 
defining the right). 
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poor plaintiffs decided by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s—Boddie 
v. Connecticut,2 United States v. Kras,3 and Ortwein v. Schwab4—the 
Supreme Court rejected arguments that all persons have a constitutional 
right to access courts to pursue their civil legal claims.5 In the latter two 
cases, Kras and Ortwein, the Supreme Court concluded that poor persons 
were properly barred from accessing the courts when they were unable to 
pay court filing fees. The shocking lesson of this triumvirate of Supreme 
Court cases is that certain poor persons who cannot afford to pay court 
filing fees can be denied access to the Judicial Branch of government to 
seek resolution of their civil legal claims. But paying court filing fees, like 
paying government-imposed fees to vote, should not be a precondition to 
the exercise of a constitutional right. This Article asserts that these three 
cases should have recognized that the poor—like all other groups, 
organizations, and persons—have a First Amendment right to access the 
courts to seek redress of their grievances, even when they cannot afford to 
pay court filing fees.  
First, Part I of this Article identifies the important role that the 
Judicial Branch of government plays in the enforcement of the civil legal 
rights of Americans and traces the development of the First Amendment 
right to access the courts for this purpose. Part II summarizes typical civil 
court filing fees and explains how available fee-waiver processes are 
ineffective. Parts III and IV consider the triumvirate of Supreme Court 
cases involving poor plaintiffs and asserts that the Court should have 
considered their rights to access the courts under the First Amendment 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Finally, Part V 
analogizes to Supreme Court precedent involving the right to vote and 
asserts that the imposition of fees for pursuing civil litigation, like fees for 
voting, violates equal protection as an improper precondition to the 
exercise of a constitutional right.6 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS COURTS 
The Judicial Branch of government performs the essential role of 
ensuring that all persons are able to enforce their legal rights, and the First 
Amendment recognizes the right to access the courts as the principal 
means by which the Judicial Branch performs this role. 
 
 2. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971). 
 3. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973). 
 4. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1973). 
 5. Although the indigent persons in Boddie were allowed to proceed with their divorce actions 
without paying court filing fees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, the Court majority stated that it was not deciding that access to the courts 
was a due process right available to all persons in all circumstances. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382–83.  
 6. See infra Part V. 
2021] The Poor & Government Redress for Grievances 759 
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall stated: “The very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to 
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of 
the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”7 Through civil 
litigation, persons can seek enforcement of their legal rights against 
entities and persons who violate them. They can also seek to invoke the 
law-making authority of judges to define the common law.8 Finally, they 
can seek to enforce provisions of the Constitution against entities or 
persons who transgress them.9 It is imperative that all persons have access 
to the Judicial Branch of government to enforce their rights under law. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America is the legal basis of the right to access the courts. It provides: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”10 
The initial Supreme Court case that interpreted the First Amendment 
to protect the right to file civil litigation is NAACP v. Button.11  
In this case, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) challenged on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds 
the Attorney General of Virginia’s enforcement of a state statute that 
prohibited the solicitation of legal business.12 The Virginia Conference of 
the NAACP had actively encouraged Black citizens of Virginia to obtain 
representation from NAACP lawyers to challenge the racial segregation 
of public schools in Virginia.13 The Court held that the NAACP’s  
activities were modes of expression and association protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments that could not be prohibited under  
Virginia’s power to regulate the legal profession.14 The Court stated  
that “under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be 
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for  
redress of grievances.”15 
 
 7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 8. A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 
(1973). 
 9. Id. at 1059–60. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–31 (1963). 
 12. Id. at 417–19, 428–29. 
 13. Id. at 420–22. 
 14. Id. at 428–29. 
 15. Id. at 430.  
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In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,16 United Mine 
Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n,17 and United 
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan,18 the Court extended to 
unions the First Amendment right of organizations to advise their 
members about their legal rights and remedies free of state regulation of 
the legal profession. In these cases, the Supreme Court recognized the First 
Amendment association and petition rights of unions to advise their 
members about how to seek compensation for work-related injuries 
through litigation and other means. The majority opinion in United 
Transportation Union stated: “The common thread running through our 
decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that 
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is 
a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”19 The 
Supreme Court also recognized a First Amendment right to access the 
courts under the petition clause in California Motor Transport Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited when it concluded that it would be destructive to hold 
that groups with common interests could not use the courts to advocate 
their causes of action vis-à-vis their competitors, unless their litigation was 
sham.20 In this case, plaintiffs sued competing trucking companies and 
alleged that defendants conspired to violate federal antitrust laws by 
commencing federal and state litigation to interfere with plaintiffs’ ability 
to acquire or transfer operating rights.21 Defendants countered that 
plaintiffs’ suit violated defendants’ First Amendment right to petition 
government for redress of grievances.22 The Court agreed with defendants 
and stated: “Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the 
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of 
the right of petition.”23  
Thus, the Judicial Branch of government performs the indispensable 
role of ensuring that all persons can enforce their legal rights. The First 
Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances 
has been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right 
to file civil actions in courts to enforce these rights.  
 
 16. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 17. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967). 
 18. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1971). 
 19. Id. at 585. 
 20. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972). 
 21. Id. at 509. 
 22. Id. at 510. 
 23. Id.  
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II. FILING FEES AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS PETITIONS 
Despite the constitutional right to access the courts, fees to file  
civil claims can be substantial, impeding poor persons who seek to  
pursue civil legal actions. For example, the fee to file a civil action in 
federal court is $402.24  
Federal district court judges may approve the commencement of a 
civil action without prepayment of fees based on the submission of an in 
forma pauperis affidavit stating the prospective plaintiff’s assets and 
asserting an inability to pay court fees.25  
Many state courts also have in forma pauperis processes allowing 
the filing of some civil actions without payment of court filing fees. 
However, these in forma pauperis processes are not available to all 
potential litigants. For example, in both Boddie v. Connecticut and United 
States v. Kras, in forma pauperis processes were not available to the poor 
persons seeking to file these civil court claims.26 Additionally, courts may 
deny in forma pauperis petitions. In Ortwein v. Schwab, welfare recipients 
sought to pursue administrative review actions in court without paying 
filing fees, but their in forma pauperis petitions were denied without 
explanation.27 Court procedures for reviewing in forma pauperis petitions 
can be lax and opaque, resulting in some poor persons being unable  
to pursue their civil legal claims based on ambiguous court processing of 
their petitions.28  
Expensive court filing fees can pose an impediment to poor plaintiffs 
seeking to pursue civil litigation. The in forma pauperis procedures 
available to overcome this impediment are often inadequate or 
unavailable, as demonstrated in Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein.  
 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) requires a $350 filing fee to institute any civil action. Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1914(b), the Judicial Conference of the United States requires an additional $52 
administrative fee for filing a civil action in a district court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914 ¶ 14 (West 2020) 
(“Administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court, $52.”). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 
 26. See infra Sections III.A, III.B. In Boddie, in forma pauperis processes were not available in 
Connecticut state court civil actions. Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 973–74 (D. Conn. 
1968). In Kras, the Supreme Court determined that in forma pauperis processes are not available in 
bankruptcy cases. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 439 (1973). 
 27. See infra Section III.C. 
 28. See Laura Ernde, Fee Waivers Denied for the Poor, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 14, 2011, at 592. 
See generally Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478 (2019) 
(surveying review of in forma pauperis petitions by federal judges and concluding that the in forma 
pauperis process in federal courts is irrational, inefficient, and invasive). 
762 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:757 
III. SUPREME COURT CASES INVOLVING ACCESS OF THE POOR TO CIVIL 
COURTS 
In Boddie v. Connecticut,29 United States v. Kras,30 and Ortwein v. 
Schwab,31 the Supreme Court rejected arguments that all persons have a 
constitutional right to access the courts to pursue civil claims, even when 
they cannot afford to pay court filing fees. The Court decided these three 
cases during the same period that it decided the cases involving the First 
Amendment right of groups and organizations to access the civil courts.32 
Thus, while the Court recognized a First Amendment right of groups and 
organizations to access courts, it denied the same right to poor persons 
based on their inability to pay civil court filing fees.  
A. Boddie v. Connecticut 
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court ignored plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment argument, but held that due process prohibits states from 
denying welfare recipients access to court to pursue divorce actions due to 
their inability to pay court filing fees.33 In this case, a class action was filed 
in federal district court alleging that female welfare recipients in 
Connecticut were unconstitutionally prohibited from pursuing divorce 
actions in Connecticut state courts due to their inability to pay court filing 
fees.34 Plaintiffs argued that this prohibition violated their First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and 
their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.35 
The three-judge district court panel dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint 
because it found no fundamental right to access court without paying the 
required filing fees.36 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision, and 
the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and transferred the case to 
its appellate docket.37 
Plaintiffs made the same First Amendment argument to the Supreme 
Court, adding that the constitutional right to access court is applicable to 
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.38 They 
 
 29. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971). 
 30. Kras, 409 U.S. at 447. 
 31. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1973). 
 32. The Supreme Court later recognized that individual persons also have a First Amendment 
right to file civil court actions under the Petition Clause. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 
U.S. 379, 387 (2011). 
 33. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374. 
 34. Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Conn. 1968). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 973–74. 
 37. Boddie v. Connecticut, 395 U.S. 974 (1969). 
 38. Brief of Appellants at 26, 29, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (No. 27). 
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further asserted that the district court ignored their First Amendment 
argument despite the fact that it was briefed and argued there.39 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the poor plaintiffs but ignored 
their First Amendment argument.40 Instead, the Court concluded that the 
importance of marriage in “society’s hierarchy of values and the 
concomitant state monopolization of the means for” dissolving the marital 
relationship compelled its due process decision.41 The Court was careful 
to point out that its decision only applied to indigent persons seeking 
divorce, and it did not decide that all persons have a due process right to 
access courts in all circumstances.42 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan asserted that the due process right to be heard requires that 
indigent persons not be denied access to courts by filing fee requirements 
when they seek to vindicate any right under federal or state law.43 
Although Justice Brennan reached his conclusion through the Due Process 
Clause rather than the First Amendment, he was the first Justice to 
recognize a constitutional right of poor people to access civil courts to 
vindicate their legal rights. 
B. United States v. Kras 
In Kras, the Supreme Court held that neither due process nor equal 
protection allowed Robert Kras to proceed to bankruptcy discharge 
without paying court filing fees.44 Mr. Kras sought to file a petition for 
bankruptcy in federal district court, but the clerk refused his petition 
because he could not pay the filing fees.45 Mr. Kras filed a motion for leave 
to file his petition in bankruptcy without prepayment of filing fees due to 
his indigency.46 
The district court judge who considered Mr. Kras’s motion held that 
to not allow Mr. Kras to file his bankruptcy petition because of his inability 
to pay court filing fees violated equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.47 The judge relied on In re Smith,48 
which held that access to the courts is a fundamental interest and court 
filing fees are not a compelling government interest that satisfy equal 
 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 383 (1971). 
 41. Id. at 374. 
 42. Id. at 382–83. 
 43. Id. at 387–88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 44. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446, 450 (1973). 
 45. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 46. Id. at 1208–09. 
 47. Id. at 1212. 
 48. Id. at 1210–11. 
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protection.49 The United States appealed the district court’s decision, 
arguing that the waiver of filing fees was unconstitutional, and the 
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.50 
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Kras argued that “there is only one right 
at issue in this case and that is the right to access the courts.”51 He asserted 
that this right derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and its equal protection component.52 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court and prohibited Mr. 
Kras from obtaining a bankruptcy discharge until he paid the court filing 
fees.53 In doing so, the Court mischaracterized the district court’s decision 
as holding that “a discharge in bankruptcy was a ‘fundamental interest.’”54 
In fact, the district court held that access to court is a fundamental 
interest.55 As a result, the Supreme Court found no fundamental interest to 
be implicated in Mr. Kras’ bankruptcy petition, explaining: “We see no 
fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability of 
a discharge in bankruptcy.”56 The Court also reasoned that, unlike the 
plaintiffs in Boddie, Mr. Kras had alternative remedies available to him. It 
stated, “In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy is not the only [legal] method 
available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his 
creditors.”57 In dissent, Justice Marshall viewed the case as involving the 
right to access the courts, the only forum in our legal system empowered 
to authoritatively resolve a person’s claim of right under law.58 For that 
reason, Justice Marshall would have granted Mr. Kras his “day in court,” 
regardless of his inability to pay court filing fees.59 
 
 49. In Smith, the district court considered the constitutionality of the filing fees in a bankruptcy 
case as applied to an indigent person and found that access to court is a fundamental interest and the 
government’s requirement of a filing fee is not a compelling government interest. In re Smith, 323 F. 
Supp. 1082 ,1087–88 (D. Colo. 1971). As a result, the court held that the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause allowed Ms. Smith to proceed in the bankruptcy case 
without paying a filing fee. Id. at 1085. Due to its reliance on equal protection, the court did not 
consider Ms. Smith’s argument that the filing fee also violated her First Amendment right to petition 
for redress of grievances. Id. 
 50. United States v. Kras, 405 U.S. 915 (1972). 
 51. Brief for Appellee at 16, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (No. 71-749). 
 52. Id. at 21–22.  
 53. Kras, 409 U.S. at 450. 
 54. Id. at 440. 
 55. The court stated “that what is at stake here is not simply bankruptcy but access to court, a 
fundamental interest.” In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 56. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 462–63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. 
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C. Ortwein v. Schwab 
In Ortwein v. Schwab, the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients 
were denied neither due process nor equal protection when they were 
barred from pursuing civil cases in Oregon state courts due to their 
inability to pay court filing fees.60 
In this case, the Oregon state welfare department’s reduction of 
benefits to two welfare recipients was upheld after the recipients contested 
the reductions in administrative hearings conducted by the welfare 
department.61 Under Oregon law, the welfare recipients had a right to  
seek judicial review of these administrative decisions in the Oregon Court 
of Appeals.62 Each moved to proceed in forma pauperis to seek waiver  
of their filing fees in the court of appeals, but their motions were denied 
without opinions.63 They then sought a writ of mandamus from  
the Supreme Court of Oregon to order the Oregon Court of Appeals  
to waive their filing fees and review their administrative decisions 
pursuant to state law.64 
The welfare recipients argued in the Supreme Court of Oregon that 
they were entitled to have their filing fees waived based on their First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and 
their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.65 
The Supreme Court of Oregon found that the First Amendment “is not 
relevant to our present inquiry”66 and held that the failure to provide 
judicial review of state administrative decisions does not violate due 
process.67 The Oregon Supreme Court further held that the right to obtain 
judicial review of an adverse decision of the state welfare department is 
not a fundamental right; therefore, equal protection is not violated by 
making such right dependent upon paying a court filing fee.68 The Oregon 
Supreme Court concluded that the welfare recipients must pay the required 
fees to file their administrative review cases.69 The welfare recipients 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the Court affirmed 
without considering either briefs or argument.70 
 
 60. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660–61 (1973). 
 61. Id. at 656–57. 
 62. Id. at 658; OR. REV. STAT. § 183.480(2) (1971). 
 63. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 658. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ortwein v. Schwab, 498 P.2d 757, 758–59 (Or. 1972). 
 66. Id. at 759. 
 67. Id. at 760–61. 
 68. Id. at 761. 
 69. Id. at 761–62.  
 70. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 663 (1973). 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decisions based on United States v. Kras.71 It found that, like the 
petitioner in Kras who had alternative remedies to adjust relationships 
with his creditors, the welfare recipients had alternative redress because 
their welfare benefit reductions were reviewed in state agency hearings.72 
As a result, the Court found that the welfare recipients were not denied due 
process.73 In a conclusory footnote, the Court stated that its due process 
analysis demonstrated that the welfare recipients’ First Amendment rights 
to petition for redress “have been fully satisfied.”74 However, a hearing 
before a state administrative agency is not equivalent to obtaining judicial 
review of the agency’s decision in the appellate courts of the state as is 
explicitly allowed by Oregon state law. Access to the Judicial Branch  
of government to enforce rights under state law is certainly one of the basic 
protections afforded under the First Amendment right to petition  
the government for redress of grievances. A state administrative hearing 
does not satisfy the important First Amendment right to access the  
courts to seek judicial review of the decision rendered at the state 
administrative hearing. 
As to equal protection, the Supreme Court found no fundamental 
interest or suspect class adversely affected by the court filing fee 
requirements and concluded that the applicable standard of review is that 
of rational justification.75 Since the state court filing fees provide revenue 
that offsets the costs of operating the Oregon court system and is an 
effective means to achieve this goal, the Court found the requirement of 
rationality met and equal protection satisfied.76 The United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon that welfare 
recipients must pay the court filing fees as a condition of having their 
administrative review cases heard in the Oregon Court of Appeals.77  
IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CIVIL COURT 
FILING FEES AS THEY APPLY TO THE POOR AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURTS 
As a composite, the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein indicate that courts should consider two factors 
in determining the constitutionality of civil court filing fees as they apply 
to poor persons who cannot afford to pay them: 
 
 71. Id. at 656. 
 72. Id. at 659–60. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 660 n.5. 
 75. Id. at 660. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 656, 661.  
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• First, does the underlying court case that a poor person seeks to 
file implicate a fundamental constitutional interest? If so, this 
factor favors the waiver of the fee under the United States 
Constitution. 
• Second, does judicial review represent the exclusive means 
available to protect the person’s fundamental constitutional 
interest? If so, this factor also favors the waiver of the fee under 
the United States Constitution. 
In Boddie, both of these factors favored the welfare recipient 
members of the plaintiff class. As a result, the filing fees for divorce 
actions as applied to plaintiffs who could not afford to pay them were held 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In contrast, neither of these factors favored the poor persons 
seeking to file civil court actions in Kras and Ortwein, so plaintiffs were 
required to pay the court filing fees to have their cases heard in court. Kras 
and Ortwein yielded the shocking outcomes of poor persons being denied 
access to the Judicial Branch of government to seek redress of their 
grievances based on their inability to pay court filing fees.  
The other shocking aspect of Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein as a 
triumvirate of cases is that the Supreme Court ignored arguments made in 
each case that all persons have a constitutional right to seek enforcement 
of their legal rights in civil courts.78 The Court also did not acknowledge 
its own decisions recognizing a First Amendment right of groups and 
organizations to pursue civil court claims under their right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances, even though these issues were raised 
in Boddie and Ortwein.79 The Supreme Court should have addressed these 
arguments and precedents squarely to determine whether the poor have a 
constitutional right to access courts to enforce their legal rights, even when 
they cannot afford to pay court filing fees. At the very least, the Supreme 
Court should have determined whether the government had a compelling 
interest to impose civil court filing fees under equal protection since these 
fees limited the poor persons’ exercise of their First Amendment rights to 
access courts.80 
 
 78. In Boddie and Ortwein, appellants argued in the United States Supreme Court that they had 
a constitutional right under the First Amendment to access the courts to petition the government for 
redress of grievances. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373–74 (1971); Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659–
60. In Kras, the appellee argued that he had a right to access the courts derived from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protection component. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 
434, 435 (1973). 
 79. See supra Part III. 
 80. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1963). 
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V. VOTING RIGHTS ANALOGY OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS COURT BY 
PERSONS WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY FILING FEES 
The First Amendment right to access courts, like the right to vote, 
should not allow the payment of a government-imposed fee as a 
precondition for exercising a constitutional right. In 1966, the Supreme 
Court decided Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections and held that 
the requirement of the payment of a poll tax in order to vote in a state 
election violated equal protection.81 In Harper, the State of Virginia 
imposed an annual poll tax on residents who were twenty-one years of age 
and older, and if the tax was not paid, a delinquent resident could not vote 
in state elections.82 The Court in Harper noted that the Supreme Court had 
long recognized that voting is preservative of all rights.83 The Court found 
that government classifications restraining the right to vote must be closely 
scrutinized under equal protection because voting is a fundamental 
interest.84 The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause is violated whenever the affluence of voters or the 
payment of any fee is an electoral standard.85 
As the right to vote provides citizens the constitutional right to 
choose their representatives in the executive and legislative branches, the 
First Amendment provides Americans the constitutional right to access the 
Judicial Branch of government to seek redress of grievances.86  
The Supreme Court has also long recognized that, like the right to vote, 
access to courts protects all legal rights: “The right to sue and defend in 
the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right 
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly 
government.”87 Under equal protection, the payment of a court filing  
fee should not be a precondition for a poor person to exercise the 
constitutional right to pursue civil legal claims in courts, just as  
the affluence of a voter or the payment of any fee should not limit the  
right to vote. 
 
 81. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). Harper is a voting rights 
case involving a similar issue as Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein: whether the right to vote in a state election 
can be conditioned on the payment of a fee. The issue in Harper is analogous to whether poor persons 
can be constitutionally required to pay filing fees to access courts. 
 82. Id. at 664 n.1.  
 83. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
 84. Id. at 670. 
 85. Id. at 666. 
 86. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972). 
 87. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized a First 
Amendment right to access courts to pursue redress of grievances for 
various groups, organizations, and persons: the NAACP;88 labor unions;89 
trucking companies;90 restaurant owners;91 major motion-picture studios;92 
an industrial general contractor;93 and a former police chief of a borough 
in Pennsylvania.94 However, the Supreme Court has not only declined to 
provide this First Amendment protection to poor persons seeking to file 
civil claims in courts, but it has also declined to address the issue when it 
has been directly raised before it.95 As a result, poor persons are denied the 
protections of a First Amendment right that is available to all other 
Americans: The right to pursue a civil claim in court.96 
Poor persons who cannot afford to pay civil court filing fees deserve 
better. They should be accorded the same First Amendment right to access 
the courts that is available to other groups, organizations, and persons. The 
poor will then be able to fully participate in the Judicial Branch of 
government to exercise their right to seek redress of their legal grievances. 
 
 88. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–30 (1963). 
 89. See generally Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 
16–19 (1964); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
 90. See generally United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 
 91. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1983). 
 92. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 52, 62 (1993). 
 93. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 535–37 (2002). 
 94. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011). 
 95. See supra notes 49, 51 and accompanying text.  
 96. The author is not the first person to assert that the poor are denied some constitutional rights 
that are available to other persons. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization 
of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) (asserting 
that the poor are denied the protections of certain constitutional rights that are available to other 
persons). 
